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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon this Court
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1986), and Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(i)(10).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Dunn's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
Mr. Dunn, an indigent, could have raised his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal when the same
court-appointed attorney who rendered ineffective assistance
at trial also ineffectively represented Mr. Dunn on his direct
appeal?
2.

Was Mr. Dunn denied effective assistance of counsel

on his direct appeal when his court-appointed counsel filed
an Anders brief which inadequately presented the meritorious
issues it did raise and completely failed to raise several
other meritorious issues?
3.

Was Mr. Dunn denied effective assistance of counsel

at trial?

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, presiding, dismissing appellant Robert W.
Dunn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Judge Murphy

summarily dismissed the petition on the ground that all of
the issues raised by the petition could e^nd should have been
raised on the direct appeal from Mr. Dunn's conviction in the
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, of
second degree murder and aggravated kidnapping.

Copies of

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I^aw and the Order of
Dismissal, dated January 12, 1988, are attached hereto as
Addenda A and B.
Mr. Dunn seeks a reversal of Judge Murphy's decision on
the ground that he should not be precluded from raising the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time
on a petition for writ of habeas corpus when the courtappointed attorney who represented him at trial also represented him on his direct appeal, and where counsel's representation both at trial and on the direct appeal was ineffective. Mr. Dunn's conviction should be reversed and he should
be granted a new trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
2

In the alter-

native, Mr. Dunn's petition for writ of habeas corpus should
be remanded to the Third District Court for an evidentiary
hearing and determination of whether he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Statement of the Facts
The Direct Appeal
On January 5, 1981, after a four-day jury trial on
charges of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping,
appellant Robert W. Dunn was convicted of second degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978), a first degree
felony, and aggravated kidnapping under Utah Code Ann. § 765-302 (1978), then a capital felony,1 for which he received
concurrent sentences of five years to life and life imprisonment.

Trial Ct. File, pp. 119, 169.

Marcus Taylor, an

attorney appointed by the court, had represented Mr. Dunn,
an indigent, at trial.

.Id. at 8.

On January 9, 1981, Mr. Taylor wrote Mr. Dunn and advised him not to appeal from his conviction. Third District
Ct. File, pp. 137-39.

This advice was based upon the

erroneous opinion that, were he granted a new trial, Mr. Dunn
would risk being convicted of and sentenced to death for two
capital offenses.2

Mr. Taylor's letter did not advise Mr.

Aggravated kidnapping was reduced to a first degree felony
by a 1983 amendment.
2

Mr. Taylor's advice was contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3405 (1978), which prohibits a court from imposing a more severe
sentence for the same conduct when a conviction or sentence has
been set aside on direct review or collateral attack. See also
3

Dunn that there were no non-frivolous grounds for an appeal.
Despite Mr. Taylor's advice, Mr. Dunn insisted upon appealing from his conviction.

In response, Mr. Taylor moved

this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel on the ground
that there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.

Mr. Taylor filed an Anders brief (a copy of which is

attached as Addendum C) which raised the issues of (1)
whether the trial court had erred in denying Mr. Dunn's motion for a change of venue, (2) whether the trial court had
erred in receiving in evidence a photograph of the victim,
(3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and (4) whether the trial court had erred in receiving in evidence bullets allegedly found in Mr. Dunn's
personal belongings.
Dissatisfied with his counsel's brief, Mr. Dunn filed
a pro se brief on appeal.

In his brief, Mr. Dunn attempted

to argue the issues of lack of probable cause for his arrest,
illegal search and seizure and insufficiency of the evidence.
A copy of the pro se brief is attached as Addendum D.

On

May 3, 1982, this Court granted Mr. Taylor's motion to withdraw and affirmed Mr. Dunn's conviction. State v. Dunn, 646
P.2d 709 (Utah 1982) (per curiam).

Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
4

The Arrest and Search
On August 14, 1980, the Utah Highway Patrol receiyed a
telephone call from a hitchhiker who reported that he had
seen a man pounding on the rear window from inside the back
of a motorhome as it pulled away from a service station in
Richfield, Utah.

Shortly afterward, UHP Trooper Bud Larsen

stopped a vehicle fitting the description given by the hitchhiker. The vehicle was being driven by Mr. Dunn. Transcript
of Preliminary Hearing3, pp. 230, 243. After Trooper Larsen
came to the driver's side of the motorhome, Howard Scott
appeared from inside the back of the motorhome and sat in the
front passenger seat.

P. 232; Trial Transcript,4 p. 442.

After requesting and receiving Mr. Dunn's driver's license,
Trooper Larsen asked for the vehicle registration.
33.

P. 231-

Both Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott searched briefly for the

registration, but were unable to produce it. T. 262. Salina
City Chief of Police Gordon Kiesel arrived and Trooper Larsen
asked Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott to exit the vehicle.

Tom

Jenson, an off-duty Salina City Police Officer, then arrived
and Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were ordered to kneel down next
to a fence facing away from the road.

While Trooper Larsen

went to search the rear of the motorhome (P. 235-37), Officer
Jenson and Chief Kiesel guarded Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott with

3

Cited hereinafter as "P.

4

Cited hereinafter as "T.
5

a sawed-off shotgun.

P. 237-38, 256-57.

Trooper Larsen entered the vehicle. P. 223. He opened
the bathroom door and found the body of a recently deceased
man who had been shot.

P. 225.

Exiting the motorhome,

Trooper Larsen asked Mr. Dunn, "What can you tell me about
the man that's in the motorhome?" P. 238. Mr. Dunn replied,
"I want an attorney. All I was told was to drive." P. 23839.
Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were immediately arrested, subjected to a pat-down search and handcuffed.

P. 240. There-

after, Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were transported to jail, P.
262, and the motorhome was placed into storage.

T. 289.

At the jail, Mr. Dunn advised Deputy Sheriff Clyde Page
that he had a medical condition and asked him to retrieve his
prescription medicine from his duffel bag which had been left
in the motorhome. T. 279-80. Mr. Dunn described the bag as
a yellow duffel bag with some shoes tied on it, T. 283, and
stated that his medicine would be found in the bottom of the
bag.

P. 121.

Deputy Page informed Mr. Dunn that a search

of the motorhome would be conducted the next day and that he
would get Mr. Dunn's medicine then.

T. 280.

The next day, a warrant was obtained for a search of the
motorhome and an extensive, six-hour search of the motorhome
and its contents was conducted.

A yej-low duffel bag was

found in the rear of the motorhome, but was not opened or
searched at that time.

T. 280-81.
6

Instead, because it was

getting late and he believed he had the right to search anything found in the motorhome, Deputy Page brought the bag to
the jail.

T. 280, 284.

There, he searched the duffel bag

in the presence of Sheriff Rex Huntsman and Sevier County
Attorney R. Don Brown.

T. 280-84.

At the very top of the

duffel bag, Deputy Page found a blue bag with a zipper closure which he described as a "bank bag."

T. 296.

The blue

bag contained some toilet articles and a small red bag closed
with a drawstring. T. 296. Upon opening the red bag, Deputy
Page found ten to fifteen unspent 25-calibre bullets.
296; P. 121-23.

T.

Near the bottom of the bag, Deputy Page

found several vials of prescription medicine bearing Mr.
Dunn's name.

T. 283.

The Trial
Mr. Dunn was tried in the Sixth Judicial District Court,
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding. Before trial, defense
counsel moved to exclude from evidence a police photograph
of the victim's bloody corpse stuffed into the bathroom of
the motorhome.

Defense counsel argued the photograph was

inflammatory and unnecessary because the fact of the homicide
was uncontested.

T. 227. Indeed, the State did not contend

that Mr. Dunn either physically struck the victim or fired
the pistol killing the victim.

T. 230, 305.

An autopsy

report and another photograph of the body were admitted into
evidence at trial pursuant to stipulation.

T. 320-21.

The

trial court denied the motion and the photograph was received
7

in evidence at trial. T. 227-28.
Defense counsel also moved before trial to exclude Mr.
Dunn's 1973 felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Trial Ct. File, p. 94. The trial court ruled the prior
conviction inadmissible except to impeach or rebut character
evidence offered by the defense. T. 236-37.

In reliance on

that ruling, Mr. Dunn testified in his own defense at trial
without putting his character in issue.

T. 388-445. After

Mr. Dunn had testified on direct, the State moved to admit
the prior conviction and the court reversed its pretrial
ruling.

T. 444, 447.

On cross-examination, Mr. Dunn was

required to testify not only that he had been convicted of
the felony charge, but also that the crime involved the
abduction of a girl.

T. 447.

Except for the testimony of Howard Scott, the admitted
triggerman, the evidence adduced against Mr. Dunn at trial
was entirely circumstantial. Scott had obtained a hung jury
at his own trial two weeks before.

T. 498. He then gave a

recorded statement about the crime and pled guilty to second
degree murder in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Dunn.
T. 519. At Mr. Dunn's trial, Scott was called by the State
only on rebuttal. T. 491. He testified that Mr. Dunn wanted
to rob Sprinkle, and that they both tied Sprinkle up and put
him in the motorhome.

T. 493.

He claimed he hit Sprinkle

on the head and shot him, using a gun Mr. Dunn had removed
from his duffle bag, only because Mr. Dunn had told him to.
8

T. 492-94.
On cross examination, Scott denied having entered the
plea bargain and claimed to have no recollection of the recorded statement. T. 498, 509. The State elicited testimony
on redirect that Scott was a diagnosed pathological liar.
T. 510.

The prosecutor then impeached his own witness by

taking the stand on surrebuttal to establish the existence
and terms of Scott's guilty plea and the contents of the
recorded statement. T. 518-19. Both the recorded statement
and Scott's trial testimony were inconsistent with several
prior statements Scott had made about the crime which
exculpated Mr. Dunn.

T. 309-315, 395-96, 481-83, 497-510.

In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Scott
"would tell a lie any time to make him look good."5

T. 556.

Aside from Scott's testimony, the only direct evidence
about the crime was the testimony of Mr. Dunn himself. Mr.
Dunn testified as follows:

In early August 1980, Mr. Dunn

was hitchhiking to Texas from his home in San Francisco to
visit his mother and seek employment.

T. 398-99.

In

Barstow, California, Ernest Sprinkle stopped his motorhome
and offered Mr. Dunn a ride to Las Vegas.

T. 401-02.

Sprinkle also agreed to give Scott, and a third hitchhiker
named Pete, a ride.

T. 402-03.

5

Scott's testimony was arguably so inherently unbelievable
that reasonable minds could not rely on it to convict Mr. Dunn
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 762
(Utah 1979); State v. Middlestadt, 579 P.2d 908, 911 (Utah 1978).
9

Scott was quiet during the ride, rarely saying anything
except to himself•

T. 403.

Sprinkle stopped once at a gas

station to buy a six-pack of beer, and again at a small town
just south of Las Vegas, where he went into a casino and gambled for an hour.

T. 404.

The four men arrived in Las Vegas just before dark on
August 13, 1980.

T. 405.

There, the hitchhikers removed

their belongings from the motorhome and the four men went
their separate ways. T. 405-08.

Occasionally, however, Mr.

Dunn, Scott and Sprinkle, ran into each other in various casinos.

T. 407-08.

heavily.

T. 409.

Sprinkle was playing "21" and drinking
Throughout the night he would give Mr.

Dunn and Scott small amounts of money for gambling and buying
drinks.

T. 404, 407, 409-11, 470.

Around 11:00 p.m.,

Sprinkle offered Mr. Dunn and Scott a ride to Colorado.

T.

411.
About five miles outside of Las Vegas, Sprinkle pulled
over and asked first Scott (who declined because he did not
have a driver's license), and then Mr. Dunn, to drive. Mr.
Dunn agreed to drive because Sprinkle had been weaving on the
road.

T. 413-14. When they reached Mesquite, Nevada, they

again stopped at a casino.

T. 415.

Sprinkle went straight

to the gambling tables and continued to drink and play "21".
Mr. Dunn had breakfast in the casino cafe.

Scott joined

Sprinkle in gambling, and would sometimes steal poker chips
from Sprinkle, cashing them in and pocketing the money.
10

T.

419-20.
They left Mesquite at daybreak, with Mr. Dunn driving
because Sprinkle was in no condition to drive. At one point,
Sprinkle went into the back and laid down on the floor and
Scott sat in the passenger's seat. Mr. Dunn tried to strike
up a conversation with Scott, but Scott kept mostly to himself. After they had travelled a while, Scott went into the
back and, without saying a word, hit Sprinkle over the head.
Sprinkle jumped up and said, "Don't hurt me and I'll give you
anything you want." Pointing a gun, which Mr. Dunn had never
seen before, at Sprinkle's head, Scott ordered Sprinkle to
shut up or he would blow his head off.
Mr. Dunn to keep quiet.

Scott also ordered

Frightened, Mr. Dunn continued to

drive. Scott tied Sprinkle's wrists together and put him in
the bathroom.

T. 422-27.

When they reached Richfield, Utah, Scott ordered Mr.
Dunn to pull into an Amoco station to buy a fuse for the CB
radio.

T. 431.

Scott was holding the gun in his hand as

they pulled into the station, and, while there, Scott would
not let Mr. Dunn out of his reach.

T. 432-34.

At Scott's

orders, Mr. Dunn bought the fuse and tried to install it.
He was shaking with fear and trying to install the fuse when
he heard a noise in the back.

T. 435.

He turned his head

and saw Sprinkle coming out of the bathroom.

T. 435-36.

Scott ran for Sprinkle, again forcing him into the bathroom
and yelled, "Get this damn thing out of here."
11

T. 436.

Scared, Mr. Dunn pulled out of the station, almost colliding
with a truck. Mr. Dunn heard noises and shouting in the back
of the motorhome, but could not see all that was going on.
T. 437-38. A couple of miles down the road, he heard the gun
go off.

T. 438.

Several times during the above episode,

Scott had threatened Mr. Dunn with the gun.

Thinking for

sure he was next, Mr. Dunn drove slowly through the town
deliberately missing the 1-70 turnoff and hoping to catch
someone's attention.

T. 438-441. A short while later, the

motorhome was stopped by the police. Mr. Dunn felt relieved
when the officer ordered him to step out of the vehicle. T.
443.
Most of the remaining evidence adduced at trial was consistent with Mr. Dunn's defense of coercion.

The strongest

contrary evidence was the discovery of the unspent bullets
in Mr. Dunn's duffle bag.

T. 296; P. 121-23.

The trial

court denied defense counsel's pretrial motion to exclude
this evidence.

T. 238, 285-86.

Other evidence showed that

the gun belonged to Scott and that Scott may have stashed the
bag of bullets in Mr. Dunn's duffle bag just prior to the
arrest.

T. 268, 295-97, 319, 344, 345-46, 374-75.

In his closing argument, the prosecutor made reference
to Mr. Dunn's request for counsel at the arrest scene.
575.

T.

The prosecutor used this remark to infer guilt on the

part of Mr. Dunn, and to disparage his defense of coercion
and duress. M .

The State also argued to the jury that they
12

should consider societal concern and outrage regarding the
crime in deciding Mr. Dunn's guilt or innocence, T. 549, and
referred to pretrial publicity surrounding the case and the
fact that the victim did not have twelve jurors to decide
whether he should live or die.

T. 548.

Defense counsel did not request, nor did the court give,
any jury instruction regarding uncorroborated accomplice
testimony.

While the court did give a jury instruction on

accomplice liability, the instruction given did not set forth
the necessary elements for a finding of accomplice liability.
Trial Ct. File, p. 316.

A copy of Jury Instruction No. 17

is included as Addendum E.

Similarly, the court gave an

instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of compulsion, but the
instruction was improper because it did not state the
prosecution has the burden to prove the absence of evidence
supporting the affirmative defense. Trial Ct. File, p. 150.
A copy of Jury Instruction No. 30 is included as Addendum F.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights to effective assistance
of counsel at trial and on direct appeal were violated. The
same court-appointed counsel who represented him at trial
also filed an Anders brief on Mr. Dunn's direct appeal.
Counsel's performance on appeal was constitutionally defective because the Anders brief inadequately presented the
issues it did raise, and it failed to raise several other
substantial, meritorious issues, including that same coun13

sel's ineffective assistance at trial. Counsel's trial performance also failed to meet minimum standards of competence
because, among other things, counsel failed to request several critical jury instructions.
Mr. Dunn was actually prejudiced by counsel's deficiencies because there is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence that the outcome of the trial or the direct appeal
would have been the same had counsel performed at the level
required by the Constitution.
Given the deficiencies of counsel' s performance at trial
and on direct appeal, the district court erred in dismissing
Mr. Dunn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional to invoke the direct
appeal rule to deny collateral relief when the same counsel
who inadequately represented an indigent defendant at trial
also inadequately and perfunctorily represented him on direct
appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING MR.
DUNN'S HABEAS CORPUS PETITION RAISING THE CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Generally, issues that were or could have been raised

on direct appeal from a conviction are not subject to collateral review on a habeas corpus petition.

See Boggess v.

Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah
2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968). This Court, however,
has recognized exceptions to this general rule.
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[H]owsoever desireable it may be to adhere to the rules, the law should not be
so blind and unreasoning that where an
injustice has resulted the victim should
be without remedy• For that reason, ...
the writ should be available in rare
cases, where it appears that there is a
strong likelihood that there has been
such unfairness, or failure to accord
due process of law, that it would be
wholly unconscionable not to examine the
conviction.
Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979); see also
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Utah 1983) (Stewart,
J. concurring).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is an "unusual circumstance" that justifies, and indeed mandates, collateral
review. See Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d
968, 969 (1968).

In Codianna, in response to the petition-

er's argument that his counsel's inexperience and unfamiliarity with controlling law justified his failure to raise
certain issues on appeal, this Court stated, "If counsel's
deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel, they constituted
a violation of due process that is clearly reviewable on
appeal or by post-conviction review."

660 P.2d at 1105.

The Court declined to review four issues raised for the
first time by habeas corpus petition, but only after thoroughly reviewing the performance of the petitioner's counsel
and finding it constitutionally sufficient.

Although the

Court found deficiencies in trial counsel's performance, in
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light of "highly incriminating evidence" against the petitioner , the Court found no prejudice as a result of the
deficiencies.

Id. at 1113.

But cf. Hafen v. Morris,, 632

P.2d 875 (Utah 1981).
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court also recognized
that " [ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause for
a procedural default." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986).

In Murray, the Court held that counsel's ignorance

or inadvertent error with respect to a particular issue does
not satisfy the "cause-and-prejudice" requirement for federal habeas review of an issue not raised on appeal. Nevertheless, the Court stated that "if the procedural default is
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth
Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State, which may not

f

conduc[t]

trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend
themselves without adequate legal assistance.1"

^d. (quot-

ing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)).

The Court

noted that the right of effective assistance of counsel is
a "safeguard against miscarriages of justice in criminal
cases" which "may in a particular case be violated by even
an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently
egregious and prejudicial."

477 U.S. at 496 (citing United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 20 (1984), and
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-96 (1984)). The
Murray Court further acknowledged that the right to effec16

tive assistance of counsel applies on an appeal as of right.
The Court reversed the lower court's ruling, however, because the petitioner had "disavowed any claim that counsel's
performance on appeal was so deficient as to make out an ineffective assistance claim."

477 U.S. at 497.

Here, Mr. Dunn received ineffective assistance of counsel not only at trial, but also on direct appeal.

Although

proceeding pro se, in arguing his petition to the district
court Mr. Dunn expressed his dissatisfaction with his counsel's performance on appeal:
THE COURT: The court needs to make a
determination, and that's what I want to
know today is what is it or why is it
that you could not present the issues
that you are raising in your petition
for writ of certiorari [sic], why you
could not have presented those in your
direct appeal.
MR. DUNN: My attorney took a lot of
heat for the case which was presented at
trial, and he filed a motion to withdraw
at the time that my appeal was due. And
he didn't want anything to do with it.
He wanted to back out of it. He wanted
to file a motion to withdraw, leaving me
hanging and leaving me without sufficient resources to pursue my appeal or
any issues I had.
I have brought that to the attention of
one motion I will submit to the Supreme
Court that I have been attempting to try
and bring issues to the court, which I
was not able to adequately pursue an
appeal. I am not a lawyer, and I don't
have a law library. It is just totally
inconceivable for me to come into one of
these courtrooms and represent and pursue a case.
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Habeas Corpus Proceedings, December 28, 1987 Hearing, Tr. at
4-5; see also Th^rd District Ct. File, p. 3, Vir 4(b)(2) and
4(c)(3), p. 134 1Mr 5-9, p. 144-45 M 1(1).

As more fully

discussed in Point II,A below, counsel's performance on
appeal fell far below the minimum acceptable level of competency.

In filing a motion to withdraw and an Anders

brief, appellate counsel asserted that there were no nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal.

In fact, an indepen-

dent review of Mr. Dunn's trial transcript reveals numerous
issues worthy of briefing and argument.

Many of these

issues were ignored completely; others were treated in an
inadequate, perfunctory fashion in the Anders brief.
Among the issues Mr. Dunn's counsel failed to raise on
appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

An

attorney may not be expected to raise on appeal the issue of
his or her own ineffective assistance at trial and, therefore, the failure to do so does not preclude the defendant
from raising the issue in a habeas proceeding.

Wiley v.

State, 517 So.2d 1373, 1378 (Miss. 1987); Bear v. State, 417
N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa App. 1987); People v. Ford, 99 111.
App. 3d 973, 426 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981); State v. Hunt, 338
A.2d 95, 100 (Md. App. 1975).

Thus, even if counsel's re-

presentation of Mr. Dunn on appeal were not otherwise ineffective, his failure to raise the issue of ineffective
assistance at trial should not preclude Mr. Dunn from raising that issue in a habeas proceeding.
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At the hearing below on the State's motion to dismiss
the petition, rather than focusing upon Mr. Dunn's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court focused upon
the pro se brief submitted by Mr. Dunn.
THE COURT: You did make a filing in the
Supreme Court on your appeal, though,
right?
MR DUNN:
My attorney, when he filed,
he had filed a notice continuously,
month after month for a year, saying he
didn't have the time to pursue it; his
case load was too large, he can't adequately pursue the transcripts to find
anything, and I just want to withdraw
from the case and let him have the opportunity to try and get counsel or take
it to federal court, leaving me just
hanging.
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, my question is:
You filed something with the Supreme
Court on your direct appeal?
MR. DUNN: I didn't know what else to
do. I just drew it up on a piece of
paper and submitted it to the Supreme
Court.
THE COURT: And when you did that, you
had the same feelings towards your lawyer that you have now?
MR. DUNN: He was inaccurate. He should
have brought issues up.
THE COURT: And did you, in your filing
with the Supreme Court, indicate to them
at that time that your counsel, Mr.
Taylor, was incompetent?
MR. DUNN: I tried to bring it to their
attention, they apparently overlooked it
or I, myself, didn't write it in the
paperwork.
But me trying to handle
something like that is like me trying to
go up to an eight-year old boy and handing him a case and say, "Take it to
19

trial."
THE COURT:
Has your ability changed
since then? Because it is clear to me
you are raising that issue.
MR. DUNN:

[non-responsive answer].

December 28, 1987 Hearing, Tr. at 5-6.
Mr. Dunn's pro se brief to this Court did not make an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Under the district
court's reasoning, Mr. Dunn was precluded from raising the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by habeas petition precisely because he was finally able to communicate to
the district court that he was raising such a claim.

This

reasoning unfairly vests Mr. Dunn with the skills, abilities
and training of a competent lawyer and places him in a
double-bind or "Catch-22" from which there is no escape. It
cannot reasonably be contended that Mr. Dunn had the knowledge or skill necessary adequately to raise the ineffectiveness of counsel claim or the other issues his counsel
failed to raise on his direct appeal.

A review of his pro

se brief, Addendum D, confirms that Mr. Dunn was severely
hampered on appeal by the lack of adequate legal assistance.
The right to effective assistance of counsel applies
not only at trial but also on appeal.

Evitts v. Lacey, 469

U.S. 387 (1985); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 497. It
is unreasonable and fundamentally unfair to charge Mr. Dunn
with the ability to identify any but the most blatant errors
in the criminal proceedings against him.
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Obviously, some

degree of legal knowledge is prerequisite to judging an
attorney's performance. The deficiencies in the performance
of Mr. Dunn's counsel identified in this brief, such as the
failure to request appropriate jury instructions

(Point

II, B, below), the failure adequately to argue the search and
seizure issue (Point II,A,2,c, below), and the failure to
raise the prosecutor's improper closing argument

(Point

II,A,2,b, below), are not of a nature an uneducated lay
person such as Mr. Dunn6 could be expected to recognize or
adequately present.

State v. Hunt, 338 A.2d 95, 97 (Md.

App. 1975) (the failure to identify and object to errors by
relatively uneducated defendant not waiver of effective
assistance of counsel). Mr. Dunn expressed his dissatisfaction with his attorney by filing a brief pro se after his
attorney had ostensibly already submitted a brief on his
behalf.

However, having not been explicitly expressed, Mr.

Dunn's ineffective assistance complaint was unrecognized by
this Court. That Mr. Dunn was able nearly eight years after
his appeal finally to articulate his complaint in a manner
cognizable by the courts should not now work to his prejudice.7
6

Mr. Dunn completed only the 10th grade and estimates his
reading ability as only "fair." Transcript of Proceedings [on
Arraignment] (November 17, 1980), p.3.
7

In fact, Mr. Dunn's pro se habeas petition was drafted with
legal assistance provided by the Utah State Prison under contract
with a law firm. December 28, 1987 Hearing, Tr. at 3. Because
prisoners are appointed counsel to represent them on their direct
appeals, the prison contract attorneys do not provide legal
21

Based upon a review of the record of Mr, Dunn's trial
and appeal, this brief demonstrates that Mr. Dunn was denied
effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct
appeal.

A new trial is therefore required.

If, however,

this Court should conclude that the record does not conclusively demonstrate the denial of Mr. Dunn's constitutional
rights, this Court should remand Mr. Dunn's habeas petition
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on matters
outside the record.8
II.

MR. DUNN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BOTH AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL
The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel9 en-

compasses the right to the effective assistance of counsel
not only at trial, but also on a defendant's first appeal as
of right.

Evitts v. Lacey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).

In State v.

Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987), this Court, adopting

assistance for such appeals, although assistance is available to
prisoners on habeas corpus petitions. There was no law library at
the prison at the time Mr. Dunn drafted his pro se brief. Thus,
as a matter of fact, Mr. Dunn's ability to raise the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel is greater now than it was in
1980 when his appeal was taken.
8

The district court dismissed the petition without acting on
Mr. Dunn's motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(i)(5). If this Court remands the petition to the Third
District Court, it should also direct that counsel be appointed.
9

Art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees an accused's
right to counsel. The Utah provision guarantees as much protection
as the Sixth Amendment, and possibly more. The Utah Constitution
provides an independent basis for the relief requested here.
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the standards set forth in Strickland, held that a party
asserting

ineffective assistance of counsel must demon-

strate:
[First] that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counself s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687.
As we show below, Mr. Dunn was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Ineffective counsel
prejudiced Mr. Dunn's defense.

Absent the errors described

below, there is probability that the results of Mr. Dunn's
trial and appeal would have been different sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Archuleta, 747 P.2d at
1023.
A.

Mr. Dunn Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel On His Direct Appeal
1.

The Anders Brief Failed to Adequately Present
the Issues It Did Raise

In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the
Supreme Court developed a framework whereby appointed counsel could withdraw from arguing a wholly frivolous appeal.
Counsel must conform to the following procedure in a proper
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withdrawal:
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly
frivolous/ after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the
court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. A copy of counsel's
brief should be furnished to the indigent and time allowed him to raise any
points that he chooses; the court — not
counsel — then proceeds, after a full
examination of the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous .
Id. at 744.
1981).

See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah

Anders, however, requires that any issue that is not

wholly frivolous deserves the advocacy of competent counsel.
Id.; see also State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 n.2 (Utah
1986).

The Anders brief submitted by Mr. Dunn's appointed

counsel failed to meet the Anders requirements in several
respects.
a.

The Anders Brief Improperly Resolved All
Disputed Fact Issues In Favor Of The
State.

The Anders brief submitted in Mr. Dunn's case contained
a sub-section entitled "Prosecutor's Evidence," in which
each important factual issue was resolved in favor of the
State.

No attempt was made to justify the arguments with

record citations or to describe the evidence adduced at
trial which caused appointed counsel to draw such conclusions.

In Robinson v. Black, 812 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1987),

such an Anders brief was found to be insufficient because
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counsel, by arguing the government's case, rather than
sketching out the potential arguments for reversal, failed
to act as the defendant's advocate,
b«

The Anders Brief Failed To Provide
Necessary Record Citations And Citations
To Relevant Case Law.

It is impossible to determine the merit of the arguments stated in the Anders brief without reading the entire
trial transcript because, not only did counsel fail to properly cite to the record, but he also failed to discuss in
any detail the merits of the issues raised. An Anders brief
which fails to make adequate record citations or elaborate
on the possible arguments for reversal is fatally defective.
United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 365-66 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that an insufficient Anders brief was grounds
for denial of counsel's request to withdraw); see Nell v.
James, 811 F.2d 100, 103-4 (2d Cir. 1987).

While counsel

did provide some record citations in Mr. Dunn's brief, the
citations given failed to point out the relevant portions of
the record with sufficient particularity.

Edwards holds

that an Anders brief must identify the arguably meritorious
issues, provide record citations and case law relevant to
them, sketch the arguments for reversal, and explain why
these arguments are wholly frivolous. 777 F.2d at 366. The
Anders brief submitted in Mr. Dunn's direct appeal failed to
meet these requirements.
One of the issues raised by the Anders brief was the
25

admission into evidence of an unduly prejudicial, inflammatory photograph of the victim. No discussion of the legal
issues pertinent to the admission of this evidence is found
in counsel's statement of the case, and only two relevant
cases appear in the section entitled "Points and Applicable
Law."

The brief fails to cite important cases supporting

Mr. Dunn's contention that the photograph should have been
excluded, including State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d
512 (1970) (graphic slides depicting the victim during the
course of the autopsy held in no way probative of the guilt
or innocence of the defendant and, thus, improperly inflammatory ).
Because Mr. Dunn was not the trigger man, a graphic
display of a bloody corpse was in no way probative of his
intent or level of knowledge about the killer's activities
(the cases cited in the Anders brief did not involve alleged
aiders or abettors); the same evidence provided by the admission of the photograph could have been conclusively shown
by other means. Id. Since the evidence linking Mr. Dunn to
the crime was primarily circumstantial, the inflammatory nature of the photograph arguably influenced the outcome of
the case. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah
1988). Given the availability of these arguments, the issue
of the admission of the inflammatory photograph was not
wholly frivolous, see State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah
1986) (it is reversible error to show gruesome photographs
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absent a showing that evidentiary value outweighed potential
prejudice), and warranted full and forceful presentation on
appeal•
The remaining issues raised in the Anders brief were
failure to grant the motion to change venue, insufficiency
of evidence and an illegal search and seizure. At least the
last of these issues required reversal and is discussed in
Point

II,A,l,c below.

For the purposes of satisfying

Anders, additional treatment in the Anders brief was required for each of these issues.

While the Anders brief raised

the change of venue issue, it utterly failed to discuss the
level of pretrial publicity which made a change of venue
necessary.

Although defense counsel raised the insuffi-

ciency of the evidence claim, he nevertheless failed to
discuss any of the evidence.

This is not the conscientious

advocacy required by Anders or Clayton.
c.

The Anders Brief Failed Adequately To
Argue That The Bullets Were The Product
Of An Unlawful Warrantless Search And
Thus Should Not Have Been Admitted Into
Evidence.

In the Anders brief filed on Mr. Dunn's behalf, counsel
raised the issue of whether the trial court erred in not
suppressing evidence of bullets found in Mr. Dunn's belongings.

The Anders brief, however, failed to cite favorable

and relevant case law or to present full argument on this
issue. The issue was not frivolous and merited argument and
briefing by counsel.

Had counsel adequately done so, it is
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reasonably probable that the outcome of Mr. Dunn's appeal
would have been different.
Most of the State's case against Mr. Dunn rested on
circumstantial evidence.

The evidence showed that the vic-

tim died as a result of two gunshot wounds, and that Mr.
Dunn's co-defendant, Scott, fired the murder weapon.

T.

494. Mr. Dunn was linked to the crime only through his presence in the motorhome, and by a bag of bullets which matched the murder weapon and were found in his duffle bag. However , the bullets should have been suppressed.
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within
narrowly defined exceptions.
753, 758-60 (1979).

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.

To be valid, the search of Mr. Dunn's

duffle bag must have been undertaken either pursuant to a
valid search warrant or in circumstances falling within an
exception to the warrant requirement.

The search, however,

was neither pursuant to warrant nor within any exception to
the warrant requirement. Thus, the bullets should have been
suppressed.
As described above, shortly after his incarceration,
Mr. Dunn informed Officer Page that he needed prescription
medicine.

T. 280.

Mr. Dunn described the duffle bag in

which the medicine was located and the placement of the
medicine within the bag.

T. 283, P. 121. Officer Page lo-

cated the duffle bag while searching the motorhome, but did
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not search the bag or remove the medicine from the bag at
that time.

T. 280-81.

Instead, Officer Page brought the

bag to the police station, where it was searched at a later
time.

T. 280-84.

The search of Mr. Dunn's bag did not fall within the
ambit of the search warrant, as the warrant obtained covered
only the motorhome.

The execution of a search warrant is

limited to the specific places described in the warrant and
does not extend to additional or different places.

United

States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert,
denied sub nom., Hubbard v. United States, 456 U.S. 926
(1982).

The search warrant allowed officers to search the

motorhome and its contents, but once property was removed
from the premises specified in the warrant, later searches
of the removed property fell outside the warrant.

Taking

the bag away from the premises specified within the warrant
removed the power and protection of the search warrant.
Because the search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag was not
pursuant to a valid warrant, to be upheld it must fall within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant
rule.

A warrantless search incident to an arrest may be

permissible where officers search the arrestee's person and
the area "within his immediate control."
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977).

United States v.

These searches have

been held necessary to safeguard the arresting officer and
to prevent evidence from being concealed or destroyed.
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This

exception has been strictly limited to circumstances where
necessary to achieve these aims.

The "incident to arrest"

exception will not justify warrantless searches of luggage
or other property where the search of that property is remote in time or place from the arrest, Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
15, or where the property is in the control and custody of
the police and the threat of injury or destruction of evidence therefore no longer exists.

See Preston v. United

States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of defendant's car after
he had been arrested, searched and taken to police headquarters held improper).
The search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag cannot be justified
under the "incident to arrest" exception.

The search was

removed in time and space from the arrest and, Mr. Dunn's
bag was in the control and custody of the police.

At the

time of the search, Mr. Dunn no longer had access to his bag
and the search was not necessary for the protection of
officers or evidence.
Warrantless searches also may be allowed where subsequent to an arrest officers have in their custody property
of an arrestee and seek to inventory its contents to protect
an arrestee's property and to protect police from danger and
accusations of theft or loss. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). However, an inventory search does not give
officers unlimited authority to search all personal effects
of an arrestee, nor can they be used as a subterfuge for
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police investigation.

Id. at 376.

Permissible inventory

searches are very limited with respect to luggage or other
similar types of personal property where the individual has
an expectation of privacy.

In such instances the police

have other means of protecting themselves from accusations
of theft or loss, i.e., they may secure or seal the entire
suitcase or bag rather than going through its contents.
Mr. Dunn's duffle bag was property subject to a privacy
interest. Sanders, 422 U.S. at 762. Police officers easily
could have secured the bag until they obtained a search warrant. Thus, the search of Mr. Dunn's bag was not a permissible inventory search.
Warrantless searches may be permissible with consent,
though the scope of the search will be limited to the actual
consent given.
(10th Cir. 1985).

United States v. Kay, 774 F.2d 368, 377
"Consent to search a specific area limits

the reasonableness of the search to that area.

Any police

activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."

Id.

Mr. Dunn did not give the police officers per-

mission to search his bag; he gave them permission to retrieve his medicine only, which he instructed them was in
the bottom of the bag.

P. 121.

Instead of simply looking

for Mr. Dunn's medicine at the bottom of his bag, the officers went through the bag item by item.

T. 280-284.

Mr.

Dunn's consent gave the police a limited right to be in his
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bag; it did not authorize a wholesale search of the bag's
contents.
As the police had Mr. Dunn's permission to look inside
his duffle bag, incriminating evidence in "plain view" may
have been seized.

Nevertheless, seizure of the bullets was

improper because they were not in plain view.

The "plain

view" doctrine allows police seizure of private property
where three requirements are met:

first, the officer must

properly be in a position from which he can view the evidence seized; second, the officer must discover the evidence
inadvertently; and third, the nature of the evidence must be
either "immediately apparent" or there must be "probable
cause to associate the property with criminal activity."
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737-742 (1983); see Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-469 (1971).

If the

bullets were packaged in such a manner that it was apparent
they were bullets and the police came across them inadvertently while reaching in Mr. Dunn's bag to get his medicine
pursuant to his consent, the discovery of the evidence may
have fallen under the plain view rule.
However, as demonstrated by the record, the plain view
exception is not applicable here.

Deputy Page, the officer

conducting the search, testified as follows:
A:

No. We went ahead with the
search warrant and then when
I got ready to leave I just
picked up the duffle bag which
was in there, which I had a
right to go through at that
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time but I didn't go through
it, because I did my other
photographing and everything
and just brought the duffle
bag back to the Sheriff's
Office,

T. 280.

Q:

Now, you say, you had the
right to go through the duffle
bag. Now, of course, that's
what we're deciding.
What
made you think you had that
right?

A:

Anything — I was searching
for certain items in there and
anything that was contained
within the motorhome, I had
the right to go into.

Sheriff Huntsman, another officer participating in

the search, testified as follows:
A:

And we got his duffle bag. He
said it would be in the bottom
of the duffle bag. We searched the duffle bag and while we
were in search for that, we
ran onto some ammunition,
twenty-five calibre ammunition
in the bag.

P. 121-22.
This testimony clearly shows that the police were
searching the entire bag and that the finding of the bullets
was not inadvertent.

The bullets were packaged so that they

were not immediately apparent or, indeed, apparent at all to
the police that they had evidence before them.

Deputy Page

testified that one of the first items he found in the duffle
bag was a small blue bank bag.

T. 296.

He looked in the

bank bag, in which there were toiletry articles and a small
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red bag.

Id.

Only upon opening the small red bag did he

find the bullets.

Id.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has made

clear:
. . . the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it
is immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them.
The "plain view" doctrine may not be
used to extend general exploratory
search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
While the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge
was modified somewhat in Texas v. Brown, the Court continues
to require that there be probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity. 460 U.S. at 741-42. Here,
the officers did not have probable cause to associate the
property in plain view —
toiletry items —
Texas v. Brown.

a small blue bank bag containing

with criminal activity, as required by
Indeed, Deputy Page not only had to open

the blue bag to discover the bullets, but had to open a
second bag which also gave no clue as to the identity of its
contents.
Deputy Page neither came upon the evidence inadvertently nor had any probable cause to associate it with criminal
activity.
pressed.

Therefore, the evidence should have been supA pretrial motion to suppress was made but erron-

eously denied by the trial court.

T. 238, 285-86.

The

failure of the trial court to grant the motion was constitu-
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tional error; that error required briefing and argument on
Mr. Dunn's direct appeal.
Defense counsel's failure to make these arguments on
direct appeal denied Mr. Dunn the effective assistance of
counsel on appeal.

Mr. Dunn's conviction rested primarily

on circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime.

By

attributing ownership and control of the bullets and, therefore, inferentially, the murder weapon to Mr. Dunn, the
State strengthened considerably the alleged link between Mr.
Dunn and the crime. Without this evidence, it is reasonably
probable that the outcome of the case would have been different .
2.

Counsel Failed To Raise Several Meritorious
Issues On Direct Appeal

In preparing the Anders brief, Mr. Dunn's counsel was
obligated to raise and discuss every argument that "a court
or another lawyer might conceivably think worth citing to
the

appellate

court

as

Edwards, 777 F.2d at 366.

a possible

ground

for error."

Even though the purpose of an

Anders brief is to inform and assist the court in determining whether the appeal is frivolous, counsel is still dutybound to act as an advocate on behalf of the petitioner.
Robinson, 812 F.2d at 1086-87.

Otherwise, the defendant

suffers a denial of the right to due process, id. at 95, the
appellate procedure violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405, and the
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defendant is denied the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.

The four issues actually raised in the Anders brief
presented this Court with only a fraction of the possibly
meritorious issues that should have been argued by competent
counsel on appeal. Other issues, including improper closing
argument by the prosecutor, the trial court's reversal after
Mr. Dunn had taken the stand of its pretrial ruling excluding Mr. Dunn's prior conviction, and ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial, should have been raised in the Anders
brief, but were not.

These issues are argued in detail

elsewhere in this brief and it is clear that they are not
frivolous.
Appointed counsel's effective preparation of an Anders
brief is vital to the fundamental fairness of this peculiar
appellate procedure. See Nell, 811 F.2d at 104. Unless the
Court is properly informed of the issues on appeal, it is
unlikely that a convicted defendant will get the benefit of
the

"conscientious" evaluation

required

by Anders, see

Robinson, 812 F.2d at 1086-88; Edwards, 777 F.2d at 365;
particularly where the appellate court is faced with a massive trial record, with which it is unfamiliar because of
the deficiencies of counsel.

The failure to raise meritor-

ious issues on appeal is a breach of counsel's duty to act
as an advocate.

Robinson, at 1086-88.

"The Constitutional

requirement of substantial equality and fair process can
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only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active
advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of an
amicus curiae."

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.

In the case at

bar, defense counsel played only a passive, ineffective
role.
a.

The Anders Brief Was Constitutionally
Deficient Because It Failed To Raise the
Trial Court's Improper Admission of Mr.
Dunn's Prior Conviction

The Anders brief was defective because of the failure
to raise the substantial issue of the trial court's erroneous admission of Mr. Dunn's prior conviction.
Just before trial, counsel moved to exclude evidence of
Mr. Dunn's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon
ensuing out of the abduction of a girl. Trial Ct. File, p.
94.

The prosecutor argued that if Mr. Dunn testified at

trial, the prior conviction was admissible as impeachment
evidence.

T. 235-36.

The trial court reserved ruling on

the admissibility of the prior conviction for impeachment
purposes, but clearly stated that it would not admit the
evidence unless Mr. Dunn put on affirmative evidence of his
good character.

T. 236.

The trial court also definitively

ruled that the prosecutor could not offer the prior conviction as evidence in the State's case in chief. T. 232. The
court further required the prosecutor to make a motion to
the court out of the jury's presence before offering evidence of the prior conviction.
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T. 237-38.

In reliance on the trial court's ruling, Mr. Dunn
elected to testify in his own behalf.

His testimony care-

fully avoided any affirmative evidence of good character. T.
388-445. After direct examination, the prosecution moved to
admit evidence of Mr. Dunn's prior conviction for impeachment purposes.

At this point, the trial court reversed its

prior ruling and granted the motion with no explanation or
discussion about why the evidence should now be admitted,
even though Mr. Dunn's direct testimony had not offered
evidence of good character.

The prosecution then began its

cross examination of Mr. Dunn with evidence of the prior
conviction.

Defense counsel objected, but was overruled.

T. 446-48.
The Anders brief in support of Mr. Dunn's appeal failed
to raise the issue of the admission of the prior conviction.
Failure to appeal the admission of that evidence constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.

It was a non-frivolous

issue which should have been appealed.

Counsel made a pre-

trial motion to learn whether the trial court would admit
the prior conviction if Mr. Dunn testified.

The court held

that it would not if Mr. Dunn presented no evidence of good
character. Accordingly, Mr. Dunn decided to testify but deliberately presented no evidence of good character to avoid
the admission of his prior conviction.
his detriment upon the court's ruling.

Mr. Dunn relied to
It was obviously

improper and prejudicial for the court to change its ruling
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after Mr. Dunn testified.
A defendant has the right to a pre-trial ruling on the
admissibility of prior convictions; State v. Clavo, 520
So.2d 415 (La. 1987) (case 1); People v. Lytal, 415 Mich.
603, 329 N.W.2d 738, 740 (1982); at a minimum, the trial
court should decide admissibility before the defendant takes
the stand.

State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 435 n.3 (N.D.

1979); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413,
357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 854 (1974).

The policy underlying these

decisions is that of fairness to the defendant who must plan
his trial strategy based upon the court's ruling.

A defen-

dant is significantly disadvantaged if he is forced to make
an uninformed decision of whether to testify.
Counsel's failure to raise this issue in the Anders
brief was constitutionally defective.

The improper admis-

sion of a criminal defendant's prior convictions is reversible error.
1986).

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah

The prejudice resulting from that error was com-

pounded in this case because the prior conviction was for an
offense similar to the one charged.

This Court has recogn-

ized that the similarity of a prior conviction to the one
charged "would be extremely prejudicial and tend to inflame
the jury. . . . "

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335.

Had counsel

raised this issue on appeal there is a reasonable probability that this Court would have granted Mr. Dunn a new trial.
Thus, the error caused substantial prejudice to Mr. Dunn,
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and the failure to raise the issue on appeal constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
b.

The Anders Brief Was Constitutionally
Deficient Because It Failed To Raise The
Meritorious Argument That The Prosecutor's Remarks During Closing Argument
Were Improper and Prejudicial

During closing argument, the prosecutor made several
improper, prejudicial remarks.

Some of these remarks at-

tempted to infer Mr. Dunn's guilt because he invoked his
right to counsel:
[Officer Larson] came up to the vehicle
and Mr. Dunn told him that this was a
drive-out vehicle from California. How
did he appear? Calm, very calm. Then
what happened? Officer Larson found the
body and walked up to him and said "What
can you tell me about the body back
there?" What does Mr. Dunn say?
"I
want a lawyer. I want a lawyer." Is
that a frightened man? Is that a man
that's [sic] so frightened . . . that he
doesn't know what to do or how to get
away? "I want a lawyer." (T. 575).
Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge erroneously
ruled that this was proper argument.

T. 576. Defense coun-

sel failed to raise this issue on direct appeal.
An attempt by the State to infer guilt from a defendant's exercise of his constitutionally protected right to
counsel is a denial of that constitutional right and is
impermissible prosecutorial conduct.

Zemina v. Solem, 438

F.Supp. 455, 465-66 (D.S.D. 1977); State v. Urias, 609 P.2d
1326, 1328 (Utah 1980).
The prosecutor's improper argument was not harmless.
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At trial, Mr. Dunn's only defense was coercion and duress.
The prosecutor's argument went to Mr. Dunn's state of mind
and was intended to undermine this defense. The prosecutor's
improper argument impermissibly compromised constitutionally
guaranteed rights.

See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,

182 (1986).
This Court has held that where proof of an accused's
guilt is based upon circumstantial evidence, there is a
greater likelihood that the jury was improperly influenced
by the prosecutor's remarks. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,
486-87 (Utah 1984).

The prejudicial effect of the prosecu-

tor's improper remarks was particularly strong in this case
as they were made during rebuttal, thus preventing defense
counsel from challenging the prosecutor's suggestion. Given
the context in which the prosecutorial remarks were made,
and the constitutional rights involved, the use of Mr..
Dunn's request for an attorney to infer guilt requires reversal and a new trial.
The prosecutor made another improper argument which
called to the attention of the jurors matters they should
not have considered. The prosecutor stated:
and even more important than
Ernest Sprinkle, Robert Dunn and Howard
Scott or anyone else, is the impact that
every jury decision has on the criminal
system and that's the most important
factor you need to consider in reaching
a just and honest decision here today
because you're going to have to live
with it and so is society and you are
all aware of the publicity that sur41

rounds this case, that surrounds any
first degree murder case and the impact
that it has when the jury reaches a
verdict one way or another. Make sure
before you determine that there is reasonable doubt, make sure that before you
elevate some of the concerns to the
point of a reasonable doubt, that you
are being fair to the most important
segment of society at large.
T. 549.

Suggestions that the jury has a duty to convict on

some basis other than the evidence is improper argument.
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (1986).

Here, the

prosecutor suggested that, apart from the evidence before
it, the jury had an obligation to convict Mr. Dunn based on
societal concerns.

The prosecutor also attempted to stir

the juror's emotions by suggesting that the victim was not
afforded twelve jurors to determine whether he should live
or die.

T. 548. These statements were totally outside the

evidence and were flagrant attempts to inflame the passions
of the jury.
Under the circumstances of this case, the jurors were
"probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching
their verdict."

Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402.

In Andreason,

the record did not contain substantial or independent evidence of defendant's guilt; rather, the State's case relied
on circumstantial evidence, as was true here.

This Court

held that given those circumstances, the jurors were more
likely than not influenced by an improper argument and
therefore reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for
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a new trial.

Id. at 403.

Despite the prosecutor's improper remarks and their undeniably prejudicial effect, defense counsel failed even to
raise these issues in the Anders brief.

The record demon-

strates that defense counsel was aware of the improper nature of at least one of these arguments as he objected to it
at trial. In similar situations, remarks such as those made
by the prosecutor in this case have warranted reversal and
a new trial.

That surely constitutes a "probability suffi-

cient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
747 P.2d at 1023.

Archuleta,

Mr. Dunn was thus denied effective as-

sistance of counsel on appeal.
B.

Mr. Dunn Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel At Trial Because Counsel Failed To Request
Critical Jury Instructions

The assistance of counsel that Mr. Dunn received at his
trial was constitutionally defective because of defense
counsel's failure to request several critical jury instructions.

These omissions prejudiced Mr. Dunn's case suffi-

ciently to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
1.

Defense Counsel Failed to Request An Appropriate Instruction Regarding Uncorroborated
Accomplice Testimony

Mr. Dunn did not pull the trigger.

The only evidence

to support Mr. Dunn's liability as an accomplice was the*
testimony of his co-defendant, Howard Scott, the triggerman.

Scott testified that Mr. Dunn knowingly participated

with Scott in assaulting, binding and shooting the victim.
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Scott's testimony that Mr. Dunn was his accomplice was not
corroborated by any other witness or direct evidence.

Utah

Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1982) explains the proper treatment of
uncorroborated accomplice testimony:
a.

A conviction may be had on the
uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.

b.

In the discretion of the
court, an instruction to the
jury may be given to the
effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed
with caution and such an
instruction shall be given if
the trial judge finds the
testimony of the accomplice to
be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.10

Under a similar federal rule, the Tenth Circuit has
held that failure to give a cautionary instruction regarding
uncorroborated accomplice testimony constitutes plain error.
United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1053 (10th Cir. 1980).
A general instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses
is insufficient to inform the jury how to use uncorroborated
accomplice testimony properly.

Id. at 1054. "[I]f the tes-

timony of an accomplice is uncorroborated, 'the court must
instruct the jury that testimony of accomplices must be
carefully scrutinized, weighed with great care, and received
with caution.'"

3x1. at 1053 (quoting United States v.

10

Section 77-17-7 took effect on July 1, 1980 and applied to
Mr. Dunn's trial which began on December 30, 1980. 1980 Utah Laws,
ch. 15 § 2.
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Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1971)).
Scott's testimony was uncorroborated, and § 77-17-7
clearly applied.

However, defense counsel did not request,

nor did the trial court give, any instruction which specifically cautioned the jury to "carefully scrutinize," and
"weigh with great care," or "receive with caution" Scott's
uncorroborated testimony.

The only instructions about the

credibility of witnesses were in insufficient general terms.
(Trial Ct. File, pp. 122-26).

Hill, 627 F.2d at 1054.

A

specific cautionary instruction was important to maintain
the fundamental fairness of the trial. Counsel's failure to
request the instruction was professionally unreasonable and
not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.
There is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the jury would not have found Mr. Dunn guilty
as an accomplice. The only evidence supporting the prosecution's argument for accomplice liability was the testimony
of Scott.

The lack of a cautionary instruction left the*

jury unaware of the significance of Scott's bias and interest, which would have significantly detracted

from his

credibility as a witness. Failure to request an instruction
or to object to the court's failure to give one, substantially prejudiced Mr. Dunn's case and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
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2.

Defense Counsel Failed to Request An Appropriate Instruction Regarding Accomplice Liability

Defense counself s failure to request an appropriate instruction as to the evidence necessary to establish accomplice liability also constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. An accomplice is one "acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense ... who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense. . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978).

A person's

mere presence, even with the knowledge that a crime is about
to be committed, does not make the person an accomplice
unless the person has an intent to join in the crime and
advises, encourages, or assists in the perpetration of the
crime.

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980);

State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977); State v. Gee,
28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (1972).
In this case, the only instruction given on accomplice
liability was as follows:
Under the law of the State of Utah
every person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of an
offense, who directly commits the offense or who intentionally aids, solicits, requests, commands or encourages
another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense, is criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
In other words, all persons concerned in
the commission of a crime, whether they
directly commit the act constituting the
offense, or intentionally aid in its
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commission, are principals in such crime
and equally liable under the law,
(Trial Ct. File, p. 136; see Addendum E) (emphasis added).
This instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to infer
that Mr. Dunn's mere presence during the kidnapping and
killing made him a person "concerned in the commission of a
crime" and thus an accomplice. Reasonably competent counsel
would have requested an instruction clarifying the prosecution's burden of producing evidence beyond Mr. Dunn's mere
presence.

Counsel's failure to request an appropriate

instruction substantially prejudiced Mr. Dunn's case because
there is a reasonable probability that but for this failure
the jury would have found him not liable as an accomplice.
3.

Defense Counsel Failed to Request An Appropriate Instruction On the Defense of Compulsion

Defense counsel's failure to request an appropriate instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of compulsion also constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Dunn testified
that, at the time the crimes were committed, he was acting
under compulsion and therefore was not criminally liable for
his conduct.

T. 435-36.

Compulsion is an affirmative de-

fense to crimes against the person.
302(1) (1978).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

The prosecution carries the burden to prove

the absence of evidence supporting an affirmative defense.
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1983).

"Clearly,

a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in presenting an affirmative defense.
47

The defendant's evidence

need only raise a reasonable doubt as to any element of the
crime to justify an acquittal."

State v. Starks, 627 P.2d

88, 92 (Utah 1981).
In State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), this
Court held that an instruction on an affirmative defense
which does not explain the prosecution's burden of proof is
improper because it
may well raise the inference that the
burden is on the defendant. The proper
course would be for the court to explicitly state that the defendant has no
particular burden of proof on the issue
of withdrawal and that the question is
whether, taking all the evidence on the
issue into account, the state has shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has not withdrawn from the commission of the offense and that he is
guilty of the offense charged.
Id. at 429 (Zimmerman, J., with one justice concurring and
one justice concurring in the result).
In this case, the trial court's instruction on the defense of compulsion was error. Defense counsel and the prosecution each submitted virtually identical instructions on
compulsion.

The court gave the instruction as requested by

the State, Instruction No. 30, which reads as follows:
Under the law, an accused person is
not guilty of an offense if he engaged
in the proscribed conduct because he was
coerced to do so by use or threatened
imminent use of unlawful physical force
upon him, which force or threatened
force a person of reasonable firmness in
his situation would not have resisted.
The defense of compulsion provided
by this section shall be unavailable to
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the person who intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he
will be subjected to duress.
If you find under all of the facts
of this case that the defendant was
coerced as herein defined, you must find
him not guilty.
Trial Ct. File, p. 150; Addendum F.
Noticeably absent from Instruction No. 30 is any discussion of the burden of proof.

This was the only affirma-

tive defense instructed upon at Mr. Dunn's trial.

The in-

struction given for each substantive offense explained that
the prosecution has the burden of proving each element of
that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The absence of any

burden of proof explanation in Instruction No. 30 impermissibly allowed the jury to infer that Mr. Dunn had the
burden of proving his affirmative defense.

Instruction No.

30 was reversible error.
Reasonably competent counsel would have requested and
objected to the court's failure to give a compulsion instruction which clearly explained that the prosecution must
disprove the defense and that the defendant carries no burden of persuasion.

The crux of Mr. Dunn's case from beginn-

ing to end was that he did not willingly participate in the
crimes.

He testified that Howard Scott ordered Mr. Dunn to

keep quiet and threatened him with a gun. T. 464. A proper
compulsion instruction was vital to Mr. Dunn's case.

It is

reasonably probable that under a proper compulsion instruc49

tion the jury would have found that the prosecution did not
carry its burden of proof and that Mr. Dunn's evidence
raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt on the substantive
offenses.

Therefore, the failure to request an appropriate

instruction on the defense of compulsion constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dunn was denied effective assistance of counsel
both at trial and on direct appeal.

The Anders brief was

defective on its face in presenting the issues it did raise
and it failed to raise several other meritorious claims, including, predictably, the ineffective assistance of counsel
(the author of the Anders brief) at trial. The defects were
cumulative.
In these circumstances, invocation of the direct appeal
rule to dismiss the habeas corpus petition denied Mr. Dunn's
right to an effective, meaningful appeal. The judgment summarily dismissing Mr. Dunn's petition must be reversed.
This Court should reverse the conviction and remand for a
new trial.

Alternatively, the petition should be remanded

to the Third District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT W. DUNN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner

-v-

Case No. C87-4664

GERALD COOK, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Respondent.
The above-entitled matter was heard on the 28th day of
December, 1987, before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy.
Petitioner was present and represented himself.

Respondent

appeared through counsel, Kimberly K. Hornak, Assistant Attorney
General.
The Court, having heard argument and having taken the
matter under advisement now makes and enters its:

1.

The Court finds that petitioner has raised two

issues in his post-conviction writ of habeas corpus: 1) whether

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on
appeal, and 2) whether the selection of the jury was unfair and
prejudicial.
2.

The Court finds that petitioner's attorney filed an

Anders brief in the Utah Supreme Court appealing petitioner's
conviction.

The Court additionally finds that petitioner filed

his own pro se brief in the Utah Supreme Court appealing his
conviction.
3.

The Court finds that the two issues raised by

petitioner in his post-conviction writ, ineffective assistance of
counsel and improper jury selection, could have been raised on
direct appeal in either petitioner's brief or in the brief filed
by petitioner's attorney.
4.

The Court finds that petitioner did raise an issue

on appeal concerning a juror who may have been prejudiced.

The

Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court had to review the
transcript of petitioner's trial in considering this issue and
that if any other errors had appeared in the jury selection
procedure, the Court could have considered such errors sua
sponte.

Having made the foregoing findings of fact, the Court
now makes its:

CQMCLfl£IQM5_.Q£_LM
1.

The Court concludes that the post-conviction writ

of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a direct appeal.
2.

The Court concludes that all issues raised by

petitioner should and could h^rve^ been raised on direct appeal.
tn *^/>w

fit*/

DATED this J u L . atty^of January, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Third District Court Judge
ATTEST
H. DUCil HiN^LEY,

I hereby certify that a true and accurate cop** ** *.Hfc*-!y w~r<
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Robert W. Dunn, Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020,
this

/

day of January, 1988.

^BA p/id^^^MJlL

j

ADDENDUM B
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

JAN
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472)
Attorney General
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK (4341)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT W# DUNN,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner
-v-

Case No. C87-4664

GERALD COOK, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Respondent.
The above-entitled action was heard on December 28,
1987 before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Third District Court
Judge, on respondent's motion to dismiss.
and represented himself.

Petitioner was present

Respondent appeared through counsel,

Kimberly K. Hornak, Assistant Attorney General.
The Court, having considered the petition and motion to
dismiss, and having heard argument finds that petitioner could
and should have raised all issues raised in his post-conviction
writ of habeas corpus on direct appeal.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss
be granted, and the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be
dismissed without prejudice.
, Db

DATED this /..^

day of January, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

/L-LJ.

/

Honorable Michael R. M
Third District Court Judg

ATTEST
H. tWCW WN5US*

Cjm£I£AI£_PJLMAiL£NS

w
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert Dunn, Box
250, Draper Utah 84020, this _2_.

day of January, 1988.
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STATE OF UTAH,
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*

NO. 17571

vs.

*

ROBERT W. DUNN,
#

Defendant and
Appellant.

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sevier County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs# Judge

Marcus Taylor
Labrum & Taylor
108 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: 896-6484
Attorneys for Appellant
Robert Parrish
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE StATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
*

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

*

Case No. 17571

vs.
ROBERT W. DUNN,
Defendant and
Appellant.

*

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged by Information in Sevier County,
Utah, with the offenses of Murder In The First Degree (UCA 765-202), and with Aggravated Kidnapping (UCA 76-4-302).

Counsel

was appointed, a preliminary hearing and pre-trial hearings
were conducted, and the case was tried to a jury in January,
1981.

The jury returned guilty verdicts for Murder In The

Second Degree and Aggravated Kidnapping.

At the penalty phase

of the trial, the jury was unable to agree as to the sentence
to be imposed.

The Court therefore, sentenced the Defendant

to two concurrent terms in the Utah State Prison of five years
to life.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

- 2 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Prosecution evidence
The Defendant, Robert W. Dunn, and one Howard A. Scott,
became casually acquainted in Southern California probably
during July or August of 1980. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were
both hitchhiking with little specific plan or direction.
Neither Mr. Dunn nor Mr. Scott had any assets except for nominal personal effects and items of clothing which each carried
with him.

Mr. Scott had few family ties except for a grand-

mother who lived in the eastern part of the country, and Mr.
Dunn left a common-law wife, apparently with his child, in
the San Francisco area. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott hitchhiked
independent of one another to the Barstow, California area,
but there obtained a ride together with Mr. Ernest 0. Sprinkle,,
the victim of the homicide in this case. Mr. Sprinkle drove
a modest sized motorhome, giving Mr. Dunn, Mr. Scdtt and a
third passenger a ride from Barstow, California to Las Vegas,
Nevada, where the third passenger alighted and has not been
seen since.

Mr. Sprinkle, Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott paused in

has Vegas for a few hours, and then continued their journey
again in the Sprinkle motorhome to Mesquite, Nevada, where
they again stopped for breakfast and gambling.
Mr. Sprinkle became somewhat intoxicated in Mesquite, and
the trio then left with Mr. Dunn driving the motorhome.

Somewhere between Mesquite, Nevada and Richfield, Utah,
Mr. Dunn and Mr. Soctt conceived a plan of taking Mr. Sprinkle
hostage, commandeering the motorhome, taking Mr. Sprinkle to
Denver, Colorado, where they believed Mr. Sprinkle's wife was
living, ransom him to her for money, and then abscond with the
money and the motorhome. Mr. Dunn had a .25 caliber automatic
pistol with him and had regularly displayed the gun to Mr.
Scott.

In furtherance of the plan, Mr. Scott assaulted Mr.

Sprinkle and then bound him with rope and placed him in the
bathroom portion of the motorhome which Was in the rear of
the vehicle. With Mr. Sprinkle thus beaten and bound, Mr.
Dunn and Mr. Scott continued on their journey making one or
two stops prior to reaching Richfield, Utah. At one of those
stops, both Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott got ovit of the motorhome,
and a gasoline purchase was made with money supplied by Scott.
The journey continued to Richfield, Utah, where a stop
was made at a gasoline station for the purpose of purchasing
a fuse for a CB radio in the motorhome.

Both Mr. Scott and

Mr. Dunn again got out of the motorhome and participated in
the purchase of a fuse from the station attendant. While
stopped at this service station, Mr. Sprinkle apparently
gained some consciousness and began to pound on the rear window of the motorhome, with his hands still tied with the rope,
and the service station attendant observed such.

Mr. Scott

and Mr. Dunn then hastily left the servide station, proceeding
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north out of Richfield, with Mr. Dunn driving the motorhome,
and with Mr. Scott in the rear attempting to again subdue Mr.
Sprinkle.

Unknown to Mr. Scott and Mr. Dunn, the service sta-

tion attendant called law enforcement officials and reported
his observations.
A witness, driving a semi-tractor-trailer, followed the
motorhome from Richfield, to Salina, Utah, a distance of 20
miles and repeatedly observed Mr. Sprinkle in the rear window
pounding and apparently calling for some reason unknown to him.
The witness concluded that something of a drunken party was
occuring in the motorhome and he was not unduly alarmed.
A description of the motorhome was received from the
service station attendant and broadcast to all law enforcement
officers in the area. A Utah Highway Patrolman observed the
motorhome in Salina, followed it for some 1 or 2 miles, and
then turned on his red light indicating the motorhome to stop.
Upon the stopping of the motorhome, and with the assistance of
other law enforcement officials who shortly arrived, Mr. Dunn
and Mr. Scott were arrested and placed in custody.

The body

of Mr* Sprinkle was found in the motorhome, with 2 gunshot
wounds, an autopsy later indicating that either of said wounds
was fatal. The .25 caliber automatic pistol was found in the
motorhome and conclusively shown to have been the murder weapon.
Additional tests revealed without question that Mr. Scott had
been the one who fired the weapon in the fatal shooting of Mr.

Sprinkle.

Mr. Scott testified that he and Mr. Dunn became

alarmed at the activity of Mr. Sprinkle at the service station
in Richfield and that Mr. Dunn suggested and encouraged the
shooting of Mr. Sprinkle.

Defense Evidence
Defendants version of the facts is essentially the same
as that of the prosecution until the point in time of the assault of Mr. Sprinkle by Mr. Scott.

Defendant contends that

this assault was spontaneous on the part of Mr. Scott, and
that he, the Defendant, was taken greatly by surprise at it.
The gun in question was produced by Mr. Scott, the Defendant
not having any prior knowledge of it, and as Mr. Scott assaulted
and bound Mr. Sprinkle, he indicated to Mr. Dunn that his life
was likewise in danger.

Thus, Mr. Dunn became every bit as

much of a hostage of Mr. Scott as was Mr. Sprinkle, and he
drove the motorhome under the direction and threats of Mr.
Scott.
When the stop was made for the gasoline purchase, Mr.
Dunn considered the possibility of an escape attempt, but
because he believed that Mr. Scott continued in possession of
the gun, that he could not escape without risking his life or
the life of the attendant at the station where the gasoline
was purchased.
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When the parties again stopped at a service station m
Richfield, Mr. Dunn again considered the possibility of an
escape, but because Mr. Scott maintained a close proximity
to him at all times, Mr. Dunn determined to forego an effort
at escape because of fear of his life and for fear of other
persons in the area. Mr. Dunn drove the motorhome as it left
the service station in Richfield at the express command of Mr.
Scott.

Mr. Dunn did so only in morbid fear of Mr. Scott, think

ing that he would be killed at any moment. When Mr. Scott fire
the fatal rounds in killing Mr. Sprinkle, Mr. Dunn was only
further placed in fear of his life and only continued to drive
the motorhome because of that great fear and coercion by Mr.
Scott.
As the motorhome entered Salina, Mr. Dunn determined to
attempt to attract the attention of the Trooper by waving his
hand out the window, but was unsuccessful in that effort. When
the motorhome was finally stopped, Mr. Dunn immediately got out
greatly relieved that he now had some protection against the
vicious nature of Mr. Scott, and attempted to explain to the
officers his status as a hostage of Mr. Scott.

In summary,

Mr. Dunn never planned or conceived of any crime either alone,
or jointly with Mr. Scott, his only involvement in the events
being that of the driver of the motorhome, and then he did such
driving only because of Mr. Scott's threats and possession of
the gun.
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POINTS AND APPLICABLE L^W

1,

Did the t r i a l court err i n denying Defendant's motion

for change of venue.
UCA §77-35-29
State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40 P.2d 961
State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P.2d 973
2,

Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence a

photograph of the body of the victim.
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
r,, ->
State v. Rinzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 n t o 3
State v. Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 454 P-2d 290
Trial transcript, Page 227
3, Did the trial court err in not suppressing evidence
of bullets removed from Defendant's personal belongings.
CooLidqe. v> Hew Hampshire, 4Q3 U»S» 443*
91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed2d 564 (1971)
United States v. Dunavan, 485 F2d 201
(6th Cir. 1973)
Floyd v. State, 24 Md.App. 363, 330 A.2d 677 (1975)
Lipovich v. State, 265 Ark. 55,
576 SW2d 720 (1979)
State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651(1972)
State v. Houser, 21 Wash.App. 20, 584 P.2d 410
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 210,
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed2d 854 (1973)
United States v. Mendenhall, 64 L.Ed2d 497,
100 S.Ct. 1870, reh den 65 L.Ed2d 1138,
100 S.Ct. 3051
Trial transcript, Pages 277-286
4, Was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict
•f the jury.
State v. Coffev. 564 P.2d 777
state v. Erickson, 658 P.2d 751

- 8 State in the Interest of S
M584 P.2d 914
State v, Daniels, 584 P.2d 880
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Fa** 14 Lines 28-29
My B U I 1» Den V. Tibbs, I knew many of you personally.
frge 17 Lin«« 2-3
As there is only 250 working days a year.
Page 18 Lines 2*3

This aattsr and ths complaining witness in this ease is Rex rtiiasman,
(he i s ths eeunty sheriff) but on page 240 Lines 15-19, at this time
we'll ask ths clerk to read the information or the amended information.
The elerkt in the tenth circiut court state of Utah, Sevier county,
state of Utah, Pxainiff t Howard A. Scott vs/ Robert V;. Dunn, amended
information ease.

fags 8* U P « 7-9
Mrs* Astria B. wenson your married 1 assuae. r*ge 33 Lines 1-5 the court
and what i s your wifes name? I2r. Gates s Del ma the court t ItM glad you
did'nt say Jean'beeause I'd be in real trouble, rage 49 lines 28-30
ever to rage SO Lines 1-2 Mr. l'erry Nora felt I don't knew , I think
all of us hare. The court» no, NO, just be earefull want to know- I don t
want anything that I don't want to hear. "Was excused"
Page 65 Lines 3-7
Kr*. Marie Blackett: Being a e.m.t. I do hare a scanner and I'r aware
of what happend that day and — the court t No, no, as I said there are
•any things that hare happend, "Was a Juror" All tht jurors are from
Richfeild Page 101 Line* 28-29 and theres just so many of you that I
can't take you all out for luneh to your just on your own. Page 197
Lines 6-8 I hare to keep you together and that will be the procedure
1*11 try in every m»y possible to make this experience a delight to
you and I thing you'll enjoy i t . Line 10 at this time your excused
until tomorrow. Page 139 Lines 23-27 Well Xguess it would depend on
the crime and how 2 f e l t , You know, if I listened to the jury."Q"
do you think you could listen to all of the evidence? Was excused.
Page 219 Line the eourtt I don't want to do this."the eourt don't
want to lock the jury up" rmge 239 Linee 13-18 I thought maybe We'D
just mention this to you can kind of juggle or adjust. Page 246 Lines
19915 tarn state first of all dees not allege that lir. Dunn shot the
victim, Howard Scott shot the victim. Page 247 Linee 6-12 The D.A.
The first stipulation i t that of the deceaseds wife krs. Sprinkle,
the would testify that she last saw her husband on the evening of
August 12 and that she returned home from work on August 13 to find
the mobile home gone, her husband gene, and no indication that he had
left to go to Denver to see his brother and to trr to find omtloyment
Page 249 - 250 Lines 16-30 over to lines 1*3 the D.A. your honor,
the first item of evidence is the stipulation between the state and
the defense concerning the testimony of Urs. Sprinkle, we would
reouest the eourt read this into the reoardv the eourtt l>s. Uargret
Sprinkle of Onterio Calif, i f called te teetify would state substantially

ae follows (1) that the i t the wife of the deceased victim in t h i s natter
Earnest Sprinkle. (2) that she lawt saw earnest Sprinkle alive on the 12th
day of August I960 at the Sprinkle residence in Calif f (3) that upon returning
from work on Aug. 13th she found a notp from Mr. Sprinkle indicating that
he was going to drive t o Denver to v i s i t with his brother*and seek employment.
Page 254 Lines 2-4 Q when he whistled and waved hie hand, what did you take
that t o seen ? "Ah I eought a ride" Exhibit "A" Page 3 Unas 4-7 told officers
he had no idea why he had been summoned by the suspects to some to the station*
Page 255 Lines 3-9 Page 256 Lines 29-30 "Q" Do you recall the exact words that
he eaid "A1* As near as I can remember he said, I want a lawyer f a l l I wes told
to do was drive Exhibit "A" Page 2 of 3 eec 14 l i n e s 4-5 Quickly in and
ordered Dunn to get out of here . Page 280 l i n e s 15-30 "Over" "QM now did you
go over there pursant t o the search war rent and obtain the duffle bag or did
you get the duffle bag before doing your search under the warrent? "A" No we
went ahead with the eeareh warrant and then I got ready to leave I Just picked
up the duffle bag which was in there 9 which I had the right t c go through at
but I did , nt go through i t . Because I did my photographing and everything and
just brught the duffle bag back to the sheriffs office. "Q" now you say you
had to go thruogh the duffle bag now ofcourse that's what we*re deciding.
What made you think you had the right? "A" anything — I was searching for
certain items in there and anything that was wontained within the motor home
"A" Yes MQ" You personaly did that? "A" Yes "Q" Did you look in the duffle bag?
while i t was in the motor homelet Salina "A" No "Q" So you brought the dufflv
bag back t o the shefiffs office before you went through it? "A" Yes Same page
l i n e s 15-30 rvw page 282 l i n e s 1-5 l i n e s 10-22 page 283 l i n e s 23-29 "Q" You
did f nt hear Scott t e l l where the b u l l i t s were at? "A" No I never saw Vr. Duna
until after I returned 1 t o the j a i l . Fage 284 l i n e s 7-22 page 285 l i n e s 4-5 of
the home and the duffle bag because of a defective warrant and affidavit.
l i n e s 10-30 over l i n e s 1-2 page 282 l i n e 30 over l i n e l f 2 t 3 . t h i s ease had
never produced Mr. Sprinkles wallet, has i t ? "A" Not to my knolage "Q" you
know that i t has'nt don't you? "A" Yee. page 109 linee 28-30 over l i n e s 1-5
and l i n e 14 "Q" and ae you were swabbing or preparing to swab the hands of
Ur. Scott he asked to talk to you; did'nt he? "A" Yee we had eome conversation.
"Q" and he began to talk about the circumstances and events of the crime;
did'nt he? "A" No. I don't belive he mentioned anything about the crime to
me.
Dec* 31st. 2:00am Richfeild f Utah. Page 314 looking a* the yer. we e re on
Dec*30 1980. Jan 1981 page 521 l i n e s 14-17 back t o page 197 l i n e s 6-8
m running a conciderable riek by allowing you to go home and I would'nt
normally do i t except I know the type of people that you are and I know
that you w i l l follow my instructions. Jan 5 1981 page 526 l i n e s 1 8 - 3
instucted 21 or 25 or 24 l i n e s 2-3-4 page 581 linee 11-19 Motion for mistrial
page 590 l i n e e 1-9 page 613 l i n e s 3-4 "Jury" you may new leave the court
room whereupon the Jury l e f t the court room "Did not leave"
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5.

ISSUES PRESENTED BT THB APPEAL.

A* Appellant filed a pre-trial Ifotion for change of
Venue, supported br evidence showing pre6trial publicity, said
Motion was denied« and Appellant elaime error therefor*
B.

During the course of t r i a l (transcript, page 227

l i n e 14 t o page 228, l i n e 2) the prosecution offered, over Appellant's
objection, a photograph of the body of thfe rictigu "/Apellant contented
that said photograph was inflammatory to the jury*
C. The court received evidence of a prior felony conviction
of Appellant over hie objection (transcripts, page 443, l i n e 23 to page
447 l i n e 30).

Appellant contends that the court erred in admitting

evidence of the prior felony beyond the date, place and name of the
crime.
D# Appellant assigns as error the admission over his objection of Exhibit 8.

Appellant contends that the Exhibit which

contained something of a brief"rhywe"f was immaterialf irrevelant,
inflammatory and prejudicial (eee transcript, page 466, l i n e 23 to
page 471 f l i n e 5 ) .
E« Appellant alee claims as error the admission of a card
which had the phraee written en i t of 'Drifter BoB? Appellant
contented that eald Exhibit was hereeay and that i t wae admitted
without proper foundation (transcript, page, 471, l i n e 17 t o page 472,
lime 29),
P#

Appellant further claims the general insufficiency of

the evidence to eustain a conviction*

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

September 3, I98O
Tine 11,1*0 A.M.
(COPY)

CRIMINAL #178

Page h line 6-11 that unlove there has been a
ahowing of •one aort of probable cause or showing
that he has, in fact, committed some crime, of other,
the court would be without jurisdiction to proceed,
and in fact, the District court would be without any
grounds for odering a thirty day commitment.
"TRANSCRIP"

Dec 30, I98O

The D.A's opening statements, page 2I4.6 line
13,lU,l5 the state.
First of all, does not allege that Mr. Dunn
ahot the victim. Howard Scott shot the victim, page
323 line 25 to 30* "My Attorney" Looking....Your
Honor, at count 1, the murder count, the mental intent of intentionally or knowingly causing the Death,
etc. The state didn't show any intent or the knowing
element on the part of the defendant; as to the actual cause of death of the victim. I think its clear
that it shows that the defendant did not cause the
death, he did not pull the trigger, he didn't tie the
victim up, and he didn't put him in the bathroom.
2.

Therea been no evidence to show that the defendant
struck the victim, tied him up, put him
in the bathroom, or pulled the trigger. Theres no
evidence to show that then© was a common plan, or a
scheme, nor a eonspracy between the two defendants
regarding that. Just an absence of evidence showing
that Mr. Dunn, aa far as his physical lnvolvment, as
far aa his aantal state, and the same thing would be
there aa to the kidnapping, the force displayed against the Body of the victim. Theres no evidence that
Mr. Dunn exercised any force. Therea been no evidence Mr* Dunn made any threats, theres been no evidence that Mr. Dunn Inflicted any bodily harm or did
anything to terrorize the victim; theres no evidence
that Mr. Dunn robbed the victim and theres no evidence that he had the mental stste required to support that count of the information,
(page 6 lines 1 to 12, 19 on)
3.

Transcript sept 3, I960;

Lawyer: Motion 1, to dismiss for insufficiency
of
process
aa the atate code, ia baaed in particular
/"• f1 o r the new Rules of criminal procedure, 4B, 6A, and
M M J 7A4rif )• My contention is that-in. paa sage of the new
criminal code it was the intent that were an* arrest
is made without warrant stating probable cauae, that,

in fact, the information or some document attached
there shows proballe cause to give the magistrate or
the court acting as preliminary examination court the
jurisdiction over the defendant to hold him, in fact,
for preliminary examination; Rule i+B lines 19 to &0
over "Lawyer: the aecond aentence of Rule kB reads
that, "an information may contain or be accompanied
by a statement of facts sufficient to make up probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate,11 and it is my contention that the words,
Iwhere appropriate,19 were added to cover a situation
much as we had here where we don't have an arrest
warrant ahowlng probable cause, and therefore, where
the defendant appears in court, there is no need for
probable cause which must be shown sufficient to hold
the defendant for preliminary examination;
Rule 6A, the second paragraph of Rule 6A, talks
about upon the filing of an information if it appears
from the information or any affidavit filed with the
information that there la probable cause and the magla trate shall cause either a warrant or a summons, as
the case may be, and its my contention that in 6A, its
in opposition to kB and its 1*3 thata supposed to cover
the situation where you don9t have an arrest warrant
showing probable cause, and therefore, it must be in
the information itself; Rule 7A, sub k$ (;;) indicates that the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense charged shall, upon the defendant's first
apparance before him, inform the defendant (;;) of
any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support
of the information, and how he May obtain the same*
At thia point we haven't had, as Z understand it,
any showing to the court of any affidavit or statement to show probable cauae, that, in fact, the defendant has committed the crime, that haa been charged,
the reason Z think that the new rules contemplate
probable cause la that prior to the enactment of the
new rules we had the deciaion of Oeratein vs. Pugh
out of the United Supreme Court in 1975 which mandate,
in my view, that la perpetration of the Utah rules#
Oeratein required, in my view, that there be an
immediate ahowlng of probable cause as soon as possible prior to a preliminary examination over the body
of the defendant for the purposes of prelimanary
examination*
Z will dlaeuss that fase further in connection
with motion #2* But Z think that aince that la the
supreme law of the land at the time of the enacting
of thoae rules that they ought to be interperted,
the Utah rules of rules that they ought to be interpreted* The Utah rulea of criminal procedure ought
to be Interpreted to be consistent with Gersteln vs,
Pugh#

mj u « f ox vnat is that we don't have on the
Information Itself any probable cause taction other
than the conolusionary atatement by the sheriff
that the Information la based upon evidence obtained from witnesses*
We don't know what witnesses eaw, what information from which witness, and basically it'a a
oonolusory statement that has lead the sheriff to
believe there is probable cause, and yet no courtIt doesn't give the magistrate any basis for
review to determine if, in fact, there was probable
oause*
Oh* if I were to surmise what the witness may
have said, and I have some insight on that based
information,
I think all the Information, at least
the facts that the prosecutor has represented to me,
and las given mer.
and I have no reason
to doubt it, and has given me all the info he has but,
basically It ahould state something as follows;
"That this information is based upon the statement," or "That the complainant states that he has
talked to a Michael Stotts and Mr. Stolts told him
that on the llith day of august, on such and such a
date, In the county, he personally obaerved both Defendants and a man having, baaed on the atatement of
Bud Larsen that he was a truck driver*
*©* to done these days on every federal information by the rules of the federal rules of procedure*
Now, its either J4B or $B and whichever one it
is,, escapes me at that point, but the case law basically states that that sort of probable cause is
the same sort of probable cause which is required on
a warrant or in the information, if it isn't on a
warrant, that would be necessary for a search warrant and In order to do that, we have to know who the
witnesses were and if they personally saw it, or if
it isn't baaed on hearsay, or whatever, and I think
the informations in this eaae doesn't give up that
basis for review*
Motion 2, li made really Independent of the rules
themselves baaed upon the fact that there has been no
probable cause shown on the face of this warrant, or
at any other time up until now sufficient to hold this
defendant for trial, or for any other further proceedings*

«* W*V.AO A ivcbion A or the constitution which is
really a foundation Article which talks in terms of
liberty or anything else being the exception.
Article X, Section 7 of the Utah constitution
basloally statea that life and liberty will not be
taken only by due process of law, and we're talking
here in my estimation at this time about procedures,
due process, and that's my statement to motion 2;
Article I, section lit of the constitution of
Utah is the equivalent of amendment k and very briefly
we're talking about the right of people to be secure
in their persons and no warrant ahall issue, but upon
probable cause, etc, so we're not talking about in
Article IV with regards to homes, but we're talking
in regards to procedure of a person in this case,
I have one other amendment to make, but the
motion on sub (e) should read amendment k of the constitution of the United states• Amendment XIV, section I of the constitution of the United states talks,
of course about, procedural due process and amendment
k talks about the right again of persons to be secure
In their homes*
My base ease with regards to motion #2 is the
Oernsteln vs. Pugh case and in the atate of Flordla
it la customary where an information or a complaint
was signed, "There was no showing of probaftle cause
prior to the time of trial itself and the Gemstein
ease haa uaed those facts so far as it violates the
fourth amendment and concluded that, in fact, it is a
violation of the fourth amendment to the United states
Constitution," and if I might read from the supreme
court reporter, 95 tup, ct, page 863 in the Gernstein
case and it really follows the situation we have here
where a policeman makes an on the aecene assessment
of probable eause and makes an arrest with process and
it quotes as follows;
"Under this practical compromise, the policeman's
on the scene assessment of probable cause provides
legal Justification for arresting a peraon suspected
of a crime and for a brief period of detention to take
the administrative steps incident to arrest.
Ex rel
Culle and Cullen G. oecci, 1970 Wisconsin
ease found at 178 HW2d 175 s Wisconsin supreme court
relied on the Wisconsin constitution Article I, section
Z found on 180- article I, section lit of the constitution of the state of Utah*
Violation again, Article I of the constitution
of Utah Article 1, section 7, Article Isect 12, Article
XIV from due process of MI amendment 6 of Untlted States
sub-title (e)t

ADDENDUM E
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17

INSTRUCTION NO.

/7

Under the law of the State of Utah, every person,
acting with the mental state required for the commission
of an offense, who directly commits the offense or who intentionally
aids, solicits, requests, commands or encourages another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense,
is criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

In other

words, all persons concerned in the commission of a crime,
whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense,
or intentionally aid in its commission, are principals in
such crime and equally liable under the l^w.

ADDENDUM F
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JU

INSTRUCTION « w
TTnHf
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f this case

that the Defendant w a s coerced as herein defined, y o u must
f ind h im no 1: gu I "1 ty

